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Abstract 
 
In this paper we use non-experimental data from government schools in Uttar Pradesh 
and Madhya Pradesh, two of the largest Indian states, to present average school outcomes 
by contract status of teachers.  We find that after controlling for teacher characteristics 
and school fixed effects, contract teachers are associated with higher effort than civil 
service teachers with permanent tenures. Higher teacher effort is associated with better 
student performance after controlling for other school inputs and student characteristics. 
Given that salaries earned by contract teachers are one fourth or less of civil service 
teachers, contract teachers may be a more cost-effective resource. However, contracts “as 
they are” appear weak. Not only do contract teachers have fairly low average effort in 
absolute terms, but those who have been on the job for at least one full tenure have lower 
effort than others who are in the first contract period.
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1.  Introduction 
 
The debate over contract versus teachers with permanent tenure (or regular) in 
government schools continues to engage academics, policy-makers and the general public 
in India and across the developing world. Many state governments in India faced with 
rapid rise in school enrolments and fiscal tightening have hired contract teachers in large 
numbers. Contract teachers have annually renewable contracts and do not have 
professional training unlike regular teachers. Their salaries are generally a fraction of the 
salary of regular teachers who are civil servants. The significant presence of contract 
teachers has raised the question of whether they are having an adverse impact on 
education quality or not. This concern is largely due to the lower educational 
qualifications required for someone to become a contract teacher and the little or no pre-
service and in-service training they are given. Appositely, weak accountability of regular 
teachers as reflected in their high absence rates and low teaching activity when present in 
schools has also been an issue of serious concern. Contract teachers, on the other hand, 
are given performance-based contracts. Their contracts can be cancelled if their 
performance is adjudged dissatisfactory by the village education committee or other local 
community bodies that have the authority to hire them. This is expected to provide them 
with stronger incentives to perform.  
 
In this paper, we use data collected from government schools of two large Indian states of 
Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) on schools, teachers and students in 
primary grades to compare the performance of regular and contract teachers. Performance 
is measured along three dimensions: (a) teacher attendance; (b) teacher engagement in 
teaching; and (c) students’ test scores. We use multivariate regression analysis to control 
for other factors that are likely to influence teacher effort and student test scores. 
 
 The paper compares average teacher and student outcomes by contract status of teachers. 
It does not present the causal impact of a contract teacher relative to a regular teacher 
since the data are non-experimental.  Even though experimental evidence is considered 
the gold standard for identifying causal estimates, they are often done to test impacts of 
specific interventions in specific contexts. The impact of a particular intervention may 
differ when it is applied or scaled up in the business-as-usual context within which policy 
makers operate. Studies such as this one that use observational data are also pertinent for 
policy-makers as they present ‘as-is’ relationships between various factors and 
educational outcomes. For governments in their business-as-usual management of the 
public education system, it is useful to refer to analysis of these average relationships 
since they are in the actual context within which they operate.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief review of the 
background behind hiring of contract teachers in India and the evidence on the effect of 
contract teachers on education quality. In section 3, we describe the data used. In section 
4, we describe state norms for hiring contract teachers in the study states and a theoretical 
motivation behind the behavior of teachers facing different incentives due to differing 
contract status. Section 5 present empirical results on teacher performance by contract 
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status and determinants of test scores. Section 6 concludes. All the tables are collected in 
the appendix. 
 
2.  Background and Literature Review 
 
Historically, the policy of hiring contract teachers was first used by some Indian states to 
provide additional support to single teacher schools, to run non-formal-education centers 
for out-of-school children, and for formal schools in remote and tribal areas. In the last 
fifteen years contract teachers have increasingly been used in lieu of regular teachers in 
mainstream formal schools. This has raised the fear that institutionalizing a mechanism of 
low-cost non-professional teachers will disintegrate the basis for providing education of 
good quality.  
 
Contract teachers hired by the public education sector in India are of many types, 
community teachers and para-teachers among others.1 All types of contract teachers, 
however, differ significantly in terms of salary and conditions of employment from the 
regular teachers in the public education system. Contract teachers are generally employed 
for a period of one year and at a fraction of the salary of regular teachers. Their contracts 
are renewable subject to satisfactory performance and more easily terminated unlike 
regular teachers who are civil servants. Contract teachers are not hired centrally by the 
central or the state governments, but by sub-state administrative bodies at the village or 
the district level. This is done with the additional motivation to decentralize the use of 
resources and decision-making to the local community.2
 
 The community also acquires 
stronger oversight on teacher performance through the extra mechanism of social norms 
if the teacher is a local resident.  
As described above, contract teachers face stronger incentives to perform. On the other 
hand, they do not have formal training like regular teachers. The minimum level of 
educational qualifications required to be eligible for a contract teacher position is low – 
usually a higher secondary school certificate. Low education levels and lack of 
professional qualifications of teachers can, in principle, have an adverse influence on 
learning outcomes of students. 
 
The evidence on comparative teacher effort across contractual status of teachers varies 
across studies and countries. In a large scale nationally representative World Bank study 
of government primary schools in India, Chaudhury et al (2004) found that contract 
teachers were no more likely to be absent than regular teachers. Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2008) in their experimental study of providing an extra contract teacher to 
schools randomly found that absence rate for contract teachers was 16% compared to 
27% for regular teachers and the difference was significant. Similarly they found 46% of 
                                                 
1 In India, education is a state subject which means that each state has the freedom to work out its own 
policies in the education sector using the national policies on education as a guiding framework. This is one 
of the reasons behind the variety of contract teacher types and their terms of employment across Indian 
states.  
2 The 72nd amendment to the Indian Constitution decentralized management and implementation of 28 
subjects, including education, to the local community.  
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the contract teachers engaged in teaching activity conditional on presence compared to 
39% of the regular teachers and this difference too was significant. Another World Bank 
study done for Peru found that contract teachers were 12-13% more likely to be absent 
than regular teachers (Alcazar et al, 2006).  
 
As in the case of teacher attendance and effort, the empirical evidence for the effect of 
contractual status on learning outcomes is also mixed. In the study by Kremer et al (2004) 
in India, the contractual status of a teacher was found to have no statistically significant 
impact on child test scores, after controlling for a host of other school, teacher and child 
related factors. In a study done for three countries in Africa – Mali, Togo and Niger – 
contract teachers had a positive effect on low ability students in low grades and a 
negative impact on high ability students in high grades (Froelich, Bourdon and 
Michaelowa, 2007).  
 
Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2007) is one of the very few studies that provide experimental 
evidence on the effect of contract status of teachers on education quality. In this study of 
schools in Kenya, student performance as measured by test scores increased for students 
taught by a contract teacher. But the study tested for a combination of reduction in class 
size and hiring local teachers on short term contract.  
 
3.  Data Description 
 
The survey was conducted in the two states, MP and UP, across 400 gram panchayats 
(villages).  In each of the states four districts were chosen purposefully and were matched 
across states in terms of the literacy rate.  The districts are Dhar, Guna, Katni, Raisen in 
MP and Hathras, Kanpur Rural, Pratapgarh and Sitapur in UP. 50 villages were randomly 
chosen from two randomly chosen blocks within each district. A block is an 
administrative unit between a district and a village.  This gives a total of 200 gram 
panchayats in each state. One government primary school was randomly selected in 
every gram panchayat. All teachers teaching grades 1 to 5 are part of the sample. 45 
students from each school, 15 randomly selected from each of grades 2, 3, 4, are in the 
sample. The survey was administered in 2006, towards the end of the school year. 
 
Measured outcomes  
Four unannounced visits were made to every sample school and village to collect 
information on the following. 
• Teacher attendance and activity. Activity is a measure of whether a teacher is 
actively engaged in teaching when the survey team arrives unannounced. Teacher 
attendance is 1 if teacher is present in school, 0 otherwise. Teacher activity is 1 if 
teacher is teaching, writing on the board, supervising written work, teaching by 
rote, 0 if teacher is absent, chatting, sitting idle/standing outside classroom, 
keeping order in classroom but not teaching, doing other non teaching work.  
There are four observations per teacher on attendance and activity. Averaged 
across visits at the teacher level, these give the fraction of visits a teacher was 
present (or engaged in teaching).   
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• Test scores of sample students who were tested on competency and curriculum 
based language and math tests that lasted 20 minutes per child. The language test 
was a test of reading and writing skills. The math test was a test of number 
recognition, addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. The total test score 
is constructed separately for language and math tests as the percent of correct 
answers.   
• School facilities survey.  
 
Additional data was collected on socio-economic characteristics of students such as 
parents’ education, caste, and wealth and on characteristics of teachers such as age, 
education, experience, wealth, type of contract and training. Table 1 presents a summary 
of variables in the data. 
 
4. Model hypothesizing the behavior of teachers by contract status 
 
4.1 State norms for selection of contract teachers 
 
Madhya Pradesh 
Contract teachers (called samvida shikshak) are hired on a 3 year renewable contract by 
the district panchayat. Applicants have to satisfy certain minimum eligibility criteria (18-
35 years of age, minimum education of grade 12, reservation if any by caste and gender). 
They are to be selected according to their rank in terms of qualification (based on a 
weighted combination of grade attained in an exam conducted for all such applicants, 
teaching experience and pre service training if any). Contract teachers, once selected, 
cannot be transferred out of their assigned schools. If absent more than entitled leave 
days, their salary can be reduced in proportion to their excess absence. There are also 
former contract teachers (called shiksha karmi) who have been made permanent recently, 
except that their salaries are much lower than that of regular civil service teachers. 
Regular teachers and shiksha karmis are no more being recruited.  
 
Uttar Pradesh 
The village education committee (VEC) is involved in selection of contract teachers 
(called shiksha mitras). An additional contract teacher can be hired if the pupil-teacher 
ratio in the school exceeds 40, up to a maximum of two contract teachers and up to a 
maximum ratio of 3:2 of regular to contract teachers. For selection of contract teachers, 
VEC is required to follow state guidelines outlining eligibility criterion (18-35 years of 
age, minimum education of grade 12, preferably a resident of the gram panchayat3
 
, and if 
there are reservations by caste and gender) and is expected to rank applicants in order of 
qualification (grades obtained in grade 12 and 10). The VEC sends a list of ranked 
applicants to the district education office which is supposed to select the top most ranked 
applicant. The contract is for a 10 month period and renewable by the VEC.  With a two-
thirds majority, it can remove the contract teacher anytime.  
 
                                                 
3 If the VEC cannot find a suitably qualified candidate within the gram panchayat, it can consider 
candidates from neighboring panchayats. 
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4.2 Hypothesis on performance of regular and contract teachers:  
 
For two teachers who are alike otherwise but differ in one having a fixed wage and 
permanent tenure versus the other having a short term contract that is renewable 
based on performance, it is easy to see that the latter will put in higher effort. 
 
Contract teachers and regular teachers face different incentives to perform and hence we 
expect their performances to differ. We use a simple principal-agent model, commonly 
used in the theory of the firm to model employer-worker relationship, to describe the 
different incentives faced by regular and contract teachers. The principal is the employer. 
The agent is the teacher who is hired by the principal to perform a task, which in this case 
is to teach in the school.  In the case of regular teachers, one can think of the principal as 
the state or district education office. In the case of contract teachers, the principal would 
be the local body that hires them. We can think of student learning as the outcome from 
agent’s effort. The agent’s effort cannot be observed and the outcome may or may not be 
observable by the principal. Even in the case when outcome is observed, it is not a perfect 
indicator of agent’s effort. The principal has to induce effort from the agent by giving 
incentives and/or monitoring. 
 
How do the two types of teachers differ in their incentives to perform? A permanent civil 
service teacher is hired at a given salary not tied to performance. This is akin to a fixed 
wage contract in agency theory. Their recruitment is permanent. Neither their effort nor 
outcome (student performance) is monitored in practice, even though a system of 
monitoring from the district education office is in place. In this case of fixed wage and no 
monitoring of effort or outcome, worker effort as predicted by the agency model will be 
at its minimum. There is no incentive to perform as a fixed wage is paid irrespective of 
performance. A contract teacher faces a renewable contract. Assuming that a noisy 
measure of either effort or outcome can be observed, if the teacher underperforms the 
contract can be severed.  
 
All else being the same, it is easy to see that a contract teacher will put in higher effort 
compared to a regular teacher with fixed wage and permanent tenure.  Given the non 
experimental nature of our data, we cannot test this hypothesis. As teachers are not 
randomly assigned contract types, selection of teachers into contract types is likely to be 
endogenous. Contract teachers may differ from regular teachers on several 
characteristics. Being on contract is likely to be correlated with these other 
characteristics, observed and unobserved, that influence school outcomes.    
 
Our strategy is as follows. In regressions of teacher effort, we report average difference in 
effort by contract type, both before and after controlling for observed teacher 
characteristics and school fixed effects that are likely to be correlated with effort.  
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5.  Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Teacher characteristics by contract status 
 
We first report on differences in teacher characteristics by contract status (Table 2). In 
both states, contract teachers are younger, more educated, a greater fraction female, with 
fewer years of experience and less likely to have any pre service training.  Most of these 
differences are significant at or below 5 percent level. In UP, contract teachers are mostly 
local whereas in MP, the average commute of a contract teacher is not different from that 
of regular teachers. This has to do with differences in hiring practices in the two states.  
In UP, contract teachers are required to belong to the gram panchayat they teach in while 
in MP, there is no residence requirement.  
 
As there are evident differences in observed teacher characteristics (and therefore likely 
differences in unobserved characteristics) by contract type, effort can differ by contract 
status not only due to the contract but also because of these other differences that are 
possibly correlated with effort. 
 
5.2 Teacher effort by contract status 
 
5.2.1 Average effort  
 
Contract teachers have higher attendance and activity compared to regular teachers in 
both states (Figures 1-2, Table 3). In UP, compared to regular teachers, contract teachers’ 
attendance is higher by 13 percent points (21 percent) and activity is higher by 17 percent 
points (89 percent).  Both these differences are significant at p values below .01.   
 
Figure 1 Teacher effort by contract type in UP 
 
 
In MP, contract teachers’ attendance is 10 percent points (16 percent) higher and activity 
is 12 percentage points (48 percent) higher compared to regular teachers. These 
differences are significant at 1 percent significance level. 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Attendance- % 
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Activity- % 
teachers engaged 
in teaching 
All 
Regular teachers 
Contract 
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Figure 2 Teacher effort by contract type in MP 
 
 
Some of the differences in effort by contract status can come from different 
characteristics of schools and teachers. Below we look at how much of the difference in 
effort by contract status remains after controlling for observed teacher characteristics and 
school fixed effects. 
 
5.2.2 Average effort controlling for observed correlates and school fixed effects 
 
We run regressions of teacher effort on teacher characteristics and school fixed effects. 
The regression equations are as below. Teacher attendanceijk is a dummy variable which 
is 1 if teacher i in school/village j in block k was present on a given visit, 0 otherwise.  
Teacher activityijk is a dummy variable which is 1 if teacher i in school/village j in block 
k was present and actively engaged in teaching, 0 if the teacher was absent or engaged in 
non-teaching task (see bottom of table 1 for definition of activity).  Both variables have 
four observations for every teacher (from the four visits). Xijk is a vector of teacher 
characteristics that includes age, gender, caste, education, whether teacher has pre service 
training, number of years of service, number of days of in service training in last school 
year, whether teacher’s appointment is on a contract basis.  fjk is a vector of school fixed 
effects.  
 
Teacher attendanceijk = a +  bXijk + fjk + εijk 
 
Teacher activityijk = a +  bXijk + fjk + εijk 
 
Table 4 presents the results. After controlling for observables, the differences in effort 
between contract teachers and regular teachers remain significant in both states. In UP, 
compared to regular teachers contract teachers’ attendance is 10 percent points (16 
percent) higher and activity 7 percent points (37 percent) higher.  Both these differences 
are significant at p values below .05.   
 
In MP, contract teachers’ attendance is 14 percent points (22 percent) higher and activity 
16 percent points (64 percent) higher compared to regular teachers. Both these 
differences are significant at p values below .05. Note that compared to regular teachers 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Attendance- % 
teachers present 
Activity- % 
teachers engaged 
in teaching 
All 
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Contract 
Former contract - 
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former contract teachers do not have higher attendance rates but their activity is higher by 
9 percent points (36 percent, p=.01).  Compared to former contract teachers, contract 
teachers’ attendance is higher by 8 percent points (11 percent, p=.10) and activity is 
higher by 7 percent points (21 percent, p=.05). 
 
To summarize, after controlling for teacher characteristics and school fixed effects, 
contract teachers’ attendance as well as teaching activity are significantly higher 
compared to regular teachers in both states. 
 
In further analysis, we examine if being in the first contract tenure or beyond the first 
tenure is correlated with contract teachers’ effort.  34 percent of contract teachers in MP 
and 38 percent in UP are in the first contract tenure. In the above regressions, we separate 
the contract teachers into two categories: those within their first contract period and 
otherwise.   
 
Results are reported in table 5. In both states, contract teachers in the first contract period 
have significantly higher attendance (39 percent in MP, 17 percent in UP) and activity 
rates (58 percent in MP, 47 percent in UP) than contract teachers have completed at least 
one full tenure. Compared to regular teachers, in both states contract teachers in the first 
tenure period have higher attendance and activity rates. Contract teachers who have 
completed at least one tenure work harder than regular teachers in MP, but in UP they do 
not differ from regular teachers in attendance and activity rates. 
 
There are three other themes here on the more general question of what are the attributes 
of teachers with high effort. The first is that teachers who are more qualified in terms of 
measurable characteristics, for example those with more education or experience, are in 
general likely to put in less effort compared to less qualified teachers. This may have to 
do with the more qualified teachers having an elite status in the community. The second 
theme is that most of the variation in teacher effort is within schools. The percentage of 
variation in teacher activity that is explained by differences between schools is 21 in MP 
and 17 in UP. The third point is that observed teacher characteristics (including being on 
contract) together explain less than 6 percent of the variation in teacher effort within 
schools. These observations are consistent with other studies, although mainly from 
developed countries, that find substantial variation in teacher quality within schools and 
that observed teacher characteristics explain very little of teacher quality (Rockoff, 2004; 
Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Aaroson, Barrow and Sander; 2007).  
 
5.3 Are contract teachers associated with higher scores after controlling for 
observed student and school correlates? 
 
If contract teachers put in higher effort due to the stronger incentives they face, an extra 
contract teacher should matter more for scores compared to an extra regular teacher. This 
would be a straightforward prediction from the standard agency model.  
 
We cannot use our data to test this prediction. As selection bias is an issue, whether a 
teacher is on contract will be correlated with unobserved teacher, school and village 
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characteristics that influence student performance. The estimate on the contract variable 
will be biased and cannot be interpreted as the effect of the contract.   
 
In the absence of a valid identification strategy, we shed light on the question indirectly. 
We examine the correlation between student performance and teacher effort after 
controlling for other school inputs and student attributes. Positive correlation between 
teacher effort and scores may suggest that contract teachers are associated with higher 
scores through higher effort. Once teacher effort is already included in the regression, the 
percentage of contract teachers may or may not be associated with scores. 
 
Test score is regressed on observed student characteristics, school characteristics and 
block fixed effects. The regression equation is as follows. 
 
Yijk = a +  bXijk + cZjk +  fk + εijk 
 
Yijk is the score of student i in school/village j in block k.  Xijk is a vector of observed 
student characteristics (age, gender, caste, mother’s and father’s literacy, wealth), Zijk is a 
vector of observed school and teacher characteristics. Since multi-grade teaching is 
widespread in the sample and it is difficult to identify a teacher to a class, instead of 
individual teacher characteristics, average characteristics of all teachers in the school are 
used. Zjk consists of teacher-pupil ratio, index of school infrastructure, percentage 
teachers with college degree, percentage teachers with graduate degree, percentage 
teachers with pre-service training, percentage male teachers, percentage general caste 
teachers, mean teacher age, mean years of experience, mean days of in service training,  
mean teacher attendance, mean teacher activity and percentage of contract teachers. fk are 
block dummy variables that control for block fixed effects and εijk is the error term.  
 
Tables 6 to 9 present results from these regressions. In UP, teacher activity is positively 
and significantly correlated with language and math scores in all grades (Tables 6-7).  
Controlling for activity, teacher attendance is not significant in the regressions.  Other 
school and teacher characteristics, except teacher pupil ratio, are not correlated with 
scores.   
 
In MP, teacher activity is positively and significantly correlated with language and math 
scores in all grades (Table 8-9). Other school characteristics including teacher-pupil ratio 
are not correlated with scores.  
 
In both states, the one school characteristic that is positively and significantly correlated 
with scores in both language and mathematics in all grades is teacher activity. This may 
be suggestive that contract teachers are associated with higher scores through higher 
effort.   
 
As an aside, note that although we report test score correlations (not causations) based on 
a cross section survey, the general nature of our findings is consistent with international 
evidence on the impact of school and teacher characteristics on student test scores. There 
is fairly robust evidence that among the school level variables which can be influenced by 
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policy, factors to do with teachers and teaching are the most important influences on 
student learning. The broad consensus is that teacher quality is the single most important 
school variable influencing student learning (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rockoff, 2004; 
Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005). But what it is about teachers that matters is not 
known. Researchers agree that many important aspects of teacher quality are not captured 
by commonly used quality indicators such as education, experience, and subject matter 
knowledge. Our results are broadly parallel to these findings in that teacher activity is 
positively correlated with student performance, unlike other school and teacher attributes 
including education, experience and training that are not correlated with student 
performance.   
 
6. Discussion  
 
The results from the paper show that within public schools contract teachers are 
associated with higher effort compared to regular teachers. And higher teacher effort is 
associated with better student performance after controlling for other school and student 
characteristics.  Attendance and engagement in teaching activity are higher for contract 
teachers compared to regular teachers in both study states, MP and UP. This difference 
remains significant and large even after controlling for observed differences across 
teachers and schools. And teacher activity is positively correlated with language and 
math scores in all three grades tested in both states, after controlling for other school and 
teacher attributes likely to be correlated with scores.  
 
Our study is non-experimental, based on observational data. In the absence of 
experimental evidence, it is difficult to estimate the causal impact of providing an extra 
contract teacher versus a regular teacher to a school. The few experimental studies that 
compare the two teacher types conclude positively in favor of contract teachers. Non-
experimental data provide analyses of average relationships between various school and 
student attributes and school outcomes in an as-is scenario. Most non-experimental 
studies too in general find contract teachers performance to be no worse or better than 
regular teachers. These results are confirmed by our study.  
 
Contract teachers now form a sizable part of the teaching force in public elementary 
education in India. The evidence so far suggests that at least in the short run, contract 
teachers are a more efficient resource compared to regular teachers. In a recent study that 
collected data on teacher salaries in the two states, we find that contract teachers get paid 
between one-fourth and one-fifth of regular teachers (Goyal and Pandey, 2008). By hiring 
contract teachers in lieu of regular teachers, the government buys the same or more 
learning output at a lower cost.4
                                                 
4 It is quite plausible that the greater presence of contract teachers may lead to more shirking on the part of 
regular teachers (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2008).  
 Given that salaries of regular teachers account for 90 
percent or more of the states’ budget on basic education, these findings are quite relevant 
for policy.  They are relevant from another aspect of the results. Of all the school level 
inputs, teacher effort is the single input consistently correlated with scores across all 
grades tested. This suggests that policies that induce teacher effort may work better than 
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input based policies in raising education quality. But which teachers are observed to work 
more than others? Our data show that teacher characteristics commonly used by 
policymakers and school administrators as indicators of teacher quality such as training, 
experience and education are generally not associated with higher teacher effort. Being a 
contract teacher is consistently correlated with higher teacher effort. This suggests that 
focusing on teacher contracts may be a more efficient way to raise effort than rewarding 
teachers on the basis of their credentials.  
An important caveat here is that contracts “as they are” will only go so far in raising 
effort. If we look in absolute terms, contract teachers are also fairly inactive. In UP, only 
36 percent of contract teachers were actively teaching. The remaining were either not 
teaching (38 percent) or absent (26 percent). In other words, even though the threat of 
insecure contract is associated with higher effort, the size of the association is not very 
large. Furthermore, we find that contract teachers with at least one tenure period have 
lower effort compared to those in the first tenure period. Incentives within the contract as 
well as contract enforcement may be weak. Do school oversight committees (or other 
hiring authorities) verify the performance of contract teachers before deciding to renew 
the contract?  Do they receive adequate information and training regarding their 
involvement in the process of hiring, renewing or firing contract teachers?  As a separate 
arm of this study, members of the school oversight committees were asked to list the 
committees’ mandated roles and responsibilities they were aware of. In UP fewer than 5 
percent members stated selecting a contract teacher as one of their responsibilities. In 
MP, less than 6 percent of members stated verifying teachers’ attendance among their 
responsibilities.  
 
   We also have little idea of the long run impact on education quality of recruiting 
contract teachers.5 Teacher remuneration policies influence the pool of candidates in the 
teacher labor market. The terms of work for contract teachers may discourage people of 
greater ability to enter the teaching profession. In India, the process of teacher 
appointment in public education is highly politicized. There is evidence from many states 
of India that contract teachers are organizing themselves and putting political pressure on 
state governments to regularize them. This has happened with former contract teachers 
(shiksha karmis) in MP who have been given regular appointments and so are left with 
weaker incentives.6
                                                 
5 Worried with the presence of a sizable contingent of non-professional teachers, commentators have 
suggested that contract teachers should be provided with some professional training to improve their 
productivity in the school system. However in cross-section analyses of learning outcomes, teacher training 
does not seem to have any significant correlation with test scores. This has been found to be true for studies 
that look at only public schools and also in studies that compare public and private schools (Goyal 2006a; 
Goyal 2006b; Pandey and Goyal, 2008). Most teachers in private schools have little or no professional 
pedagogical training and in general, their students have better test scores compared to counterparts in 
public schools. While the minimum educational qualifications required for a contract teacher is generally 
grade 12, many of the actual contract teachers in position have post-secondary education reflecting poor 
labor market conditions.  
 If this process of using the contract teacher system as a by-way to a 
regular appointment continues, the education system may end up with a large number of 
non-professional teachers who will have the same weak performance incentives as the 
current regular teachers.  
6 We find that shiksha karmis have lower teaching activity compared to contract teachers. 
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  Table 1 Summary of Key Variables 
 UP 
Mean               Std. Dev. 
MP 
Mean              Std. Dev. 
Mean Student variables     
% Correct score 
Grade 4- Math  
.23 .29 .29 .29 
Grade 4- language  .27 .35 .33 .34 
Grade 3- Math  .17 .28 .26 .30 
Grade 3- language  .21 .32 .30 .35 
Grade 2- Math .13 .26 .25 .31 
Grade 2- language .20 .29 .31 .33 
Age 8.72 1.61 8.95 1.57 
Gender (1 if male) .49 .50 .51 .50 
General caste (neither SC/ST, nor OBC) .15 .36 .20 .40 
OBC .40 .49 .31 .46 
SC .44 .50 .15 .36 
ST - - .34 .47 
Mother literate .21 .40 .13 .33 
Father literate .60 .49 .46 .50 
Land owned (in acres) 1.13 1.65 2.50 4.27 
Mean School characteristics     
Enrollment 178 89 119 66 
Pupil-teacher ratio 66 39 56 30 
% schools with toilet .33 .47 .38 .49 
% schools with drinking water .83 .38 .72 .45 
% schools with playground .79 .41 .50 .50 
% schools with electricity .01 .07 .07 .25 
Number of blackboards 3.75 1.77 3.32 1.84 
Mean Teacher characteristics 
    
Attendance (mean over 4 visits) .64 .48 .67 .47 
Activity (mean over 4 visits) .25 .43 .30 .46 
% of contract teachers .41 .20 .15 .36 
% of former contract - - .45 .50 
Age (years) 38 14 39 9 
Non-SC/ST (general caste+OBC) .80 .40 .69 .46 
Male .60 .49 .80 .40 
% with class 12 degree .42 .49 .48 .50 
% with college degree .32 .47 .30 .46 
% with graduate degree .26 .44 .23 .42 
% with preservice training .59 .49 .36 .48 
Distance to work (km) 6 10 9 12 
Teaching experience (years) 10.9 13 13.8 10 
% doing multigrade .81 .39 .87 .34 
Days of in service training in last school year 5.83 8 10.95 12 
Definition of variables: Teacher attendance= 1 if teacher present, 0 otherwise (and averaged over the four 
visits), teacher activity=1 if teacher actively engaged in teaching i.e., if teacher is teaching, writing on the 
board, supervising written work, teaching by rote, 0 if teacher is absent, chatting with others, sitting 
idle/standing outside classroom, keeping order in school/class but not teaching, doing some other work 
unrelated to teaching (and averaged over the four visits)  
Index of infrastructure in school= sum of four indicator variables for whether school has water, toilet, 
playground, electricity and the total number of blackboards in school. 
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Table 2 Average teacher characteristics 
Percentage unless 
indicated otherwise 
UP 
Regular  Contract        p1 
MP 
Regular     Contract        p1       Former contract     p2 
Age (years) 46 27 .00 45 31 .00 34 .00 
Non- SC/ST .83 .76 .03 .75 .65 .20 .65 .03 
Male  .71 .45 .00 .93 .72 .00 .70 .00 
Highest education- 
whether class 12 
.49 .32 .00 .58 .47 .15 .38 .00 
Whether college 
degree 
.24 .45 .00 .25 .36 .13 .33 .08 
Whether graduate 
degree 
.28 .24 .25 .17 .17 .99 .29 .00 
Pre service training .93 .08 .00 .56 .17 .00 .22 .00 
Days of in service 
training in last school 
year 
5 6 .14 10 10 .98 12 .24 
Years of teaching 
experience 
17 2 .00 21 5 .00 9 .00 
Distance commute to 
school (in km) 
10 1 .00 9 12 .09 8 .63 
1  Robust p values for difference between regular and contract teachers.  
2 Robust p values for difference between regular and former contract teachers.  
 
             Table 3 Average teacher attendance and activity1 
 Attendance Activity 
 UP MP UP MP 
All 0.64 0.67 0.25 0.3 
Regular teachers 0.61 0.63 0.19 0.25 
Contract 0.74 0.73 0.36 0.37 
p value (contract- regular) (.00)   ( .00) (.00) (.00) 
     
Former contract - 0.71 - 0.34 
p value (former contract-regular)  (.00)  (.00) 
p value (former contract-contract)  (.47)  (.45) 
                        1  Robust p values are reported.  
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Table 4 MP and UP OLS: Village fixed effects regression of teacher effort 
(Dependent variable has four observations per teacher: Attendance=1 if teacher present, 0 
otherwise: Activity=1 if teacher actively engaged in teaching, 0 otherwise) 
 Attendance Activity Attendance Activity 
Whether teacher is contract 
teacher 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.16 
 (0.05)* (0.04)* (0.03)* (0.00)** 
Whether shiksha karmi 
(former contract teachers) - - 0.06 0.09 
   (0.17) (0.01)* 
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.05)* (0.03)* (0.00)** 
Caste (1 if non- SC) -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.31) (0.63) (0.71) (0.14) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.00 
 (0.57) (0.00)** (0.10) (0.89) 
College educated -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04)* (0.13) (0.17) (0.06) 
Graduate degree -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.00)** (0.01)* (0.47) (0.25) 
Pre service training -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.39) (0.88) (0.37) (0.41) 
Years of service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.22) (0.69) (0.34) (0.01)** 
Days of in service training 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.90) (0.63) (0.67) (0.34) 
     
School fixed effect (200 
schools) 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
R2 .18 .23 .23 .22 
Observations 2416 2415 1792 1792 
         Robust p values in parentheses clustered at teacher level. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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       Table 5 MP and UP  OLS: Village fixed effects regression of teacher effort 
(Dependent variable has four observations per teacher: Attendance=1 if teacher present, 0 
otherwise: Activity=1 if teacher actively engaged in teaching, 0 otherwise) 
                     MP                 UP 
 Attendance Activity Attendance Activity 
Whether contract teacher in 
first contract tenure  0.40 0.36 0.19 0.17 
 (0.00)** (0.04)* (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Whether contract teacher for 
longer than first contract 
tenure 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04)** (0.19) (0.32) 
Whether shiksha karmi (former 
contract teachers- MP only) 0.06 0.09 - - 
 (0.18) (0.01)*   
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.03)* (0.00)** (0.06) (0.01)* 
Caste (1 if non- SC) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.64) (0.15) (0.21) (0.89) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 
 (0.13) (0.82) (0.67) (0.00)** 
College educated -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.14) (0.05)* (0.07) (0.27) 
Graduate degree -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 
 (0.43) (0.23) (0.00)** (0.03)* 
Pre service training -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.53) (0.82) 
Years of service 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.33) (0.01)** (0.11) (0.88) 
Days of in service training 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.64) (0.33) (0.53) (0.62) 
     
School fixed effect  
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 .24 .22 .18 .24 
Observations 1792 1792 2416 2415 
Robust p values in parentheses clustered at teacher level   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 6 OLS: Are school and teacher characteristics correlated with scores?  
Dependent variable is percent correct score, Grade 4, UP  
 Hindi Math Hindi Math Hindi Math 
Teacher-pupil ratio 5.00 5.00 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 
 (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Index of infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.91) (0.70) (0.88) (0.62) (0.85) (0.62) 
% non-sc  teachers -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.56) (0.15) (0.56) (0.15) (0.54) (0.13) 
% male teachers 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.88) (0.70) (0.89) (0.71) (0.84) (0.66) 
% teachers with college deg 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 
 (0.27) (0.72) (0.29) (0.83) (0.23) (0.62) 
% teachers with graduate deg 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 
    (0.25) (0.56) (0.25) (0.57) (0.21) (0.47) 
Av. Years of service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.68) (0.60) (0.63) (0.76) (0.51) (0.86) 
Av. days in service in last year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.91) (0.41) (0.92) (0.40) (0.96) (0.30) 
% teachers with  pre service 
training 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.04 
 (0.80) (0.64) (0.80) (0.64) (0.32) (0.41) 
% teachers doing multi grade 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 (0.94) (0.53) (0.94) (0.54) (0.95) (0.51) 
% teachers actively engaged in 
teaching (mean over 4 visits) 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.13 
 (0.05)* (0.01)* (0.05)* (0.00)** (0.09) + (0.03)* 
% teachers present in school 
(mean over 4 visits) - - -0.02 -0.05 - - 
 - - (0.73) (0.28) - - 
% contract teachers - -   0.10 0.11 
 - -   (0.26) (0.10)+ 
Block fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 
Robust p values in parentheses clustered at GP level, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant 
at 10%.   Other controls include student family background characteristics and block fixed effects. 
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Table 7 OLS: Are school and teacher characteristics correlated with scores?   
Dependent variable is percent correct score, Grades 3 and 2, UP  
 Hindi 
Grade 3 
Math 
Grade 3 
Hindi 
Grade 3 
Math 
Grade 3 
Hindi 
Grade 2 
Math 
Grade 2 
Hindi 
Grade 2 
Math 
Grade 2 
Teacher-pupil ratio 5.83 5.33 5.83 5.33 4.4 3.7 4.4 3.7 
 (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Index of infrastructure 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.16) (0.33) (0.16) (0.31) (0.20) (0.60) (0.20) (0.55) 
% non-sc  teachers -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.93) (0.54) (0.93) (0.53) (0.78) (0.52) (0.78) (0.52) 
% male teachers 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
 (0.44) (0.78) (0.45) (0.76) (0.18) (0.89) (0.18) (0.93) 
% teachers with college 
deg 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 
 (0.01)* (0.34) (0.02)* (0.31) (0.01)* (0.06)+ (0.01)* (0.06) + 
% teachers with graduate 
deg 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.29) (0.34) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) 
Av. Years of service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.38) (0.84) (0.40) (0.91) (0.97) (0.83) (0.95) (0.73) 
Av. days of in service 
last year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.003 0.00 -0.003 
 (0.79) (0.41) (0.79) (0.38) (0.41) (0.06)+ (0.44) (0.05)* 
% teachers with  pre 
service training 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.40) (0.91) (0.47) (0.84) (0.53) (0.59) (0.61) (0.31) 
% teachers doing multi 
grade 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.84) (0.44) (0.84) (0.43) (0.93) (0.74) (0.93) (0.73) 
% teachers actively 
engaged in teaching 
(mean over 4 visits) 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.10 
 (0.05)* (0.03)* (0.05)* (0.03)* (0.00)** (0.01)* (0.00)** (0.02)* 
% contract teachers - - 0.00 0.03 - - -0.01 0.04 
 - - (0.99) (0.65) - - (0.88) (0.45) 
Block fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 2673 2670 2673 2670 2697 2695 2697 2695 
Robust p values in parentheses clustered at GP level, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; +significant 
at 10%.  Other controls include student family background characteristics and block fixed effects. 
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Table 8 OLS: Are school/teacher characteristics correlated with scores?  
Dependent variable is percent correct score, Grade 4, MP  
 Hindi Math Hindi Math Hindi Math 
Teacher-pupil ratio 1.11 0.22 0.96 0.14 1.05 0.21 
 (0.34) (0.78) (0.41) (0.86) (0.36) (0.79) 
Index of infrastructure 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.72) (0.10)+ (0.67) (0.13) (0.74) 
% non-sc  teachers -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.26) (0.21) (0.18) (0.16) (0.29) (0.21) 
% male teachers -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.52) (0.34) (0.54) (0.35) (0.64) (0.37) 
% teachers with college deg 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.80) (0.55) (0.79) (0.55) (0.82) (0.55) 
% teachers with graduate deg 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.57) (0.40) (0.51) (0.35) (0.52) (0.35) 
Av. Years of service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.29) (0.37) (0.58) (0.66) 
Av. days of in service last year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.41) (0.44) (0.43) (0.46) (0.40) 
% teachers with  pre service 
training -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.63) (0.23) (0.72) (0.26) (0.59) (0.22) 
% teachers doing multi grade -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.12) (0.22) (0.16) (0.26) 
% teachers actively engaged in 
teaching (mean over 4 visits) 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.18 
 (0.03)* (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.04)* (0.00)** 
% teachers present in school - - -0.09 -0.05 - - 
 - - (0.19) (0.42) - - 
% contract teachers  - - - - -0.11 -0.04 
 - - - - (0.14) (0.53) 
% shiksha karmi teachers (former 
contract teachers) - - - - 0.00 -0.01 
 - - - - (0.94) (0.77) 
Block fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 2142 2142 2142 2142 2142 2142 
Robust p values in parentheses clustered at GP level, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; +significant 
at 10%. Other controls include student family background characteristics and block fixed effects. 
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Table 9 OLS: Are school/teacher characteristics correlated with scores? 
Dependent variable is percent correct score, Grades 3 and 2, MP  
 Hindi 
Grade 3 
Math 
Grade 3 
Hindi 
Grade 3 
Math 
Grade 3 
Hindi 
Grade 2 
Math 
Grade 2 
Hindi 
Grade 2 
Math 
Grade 2 
Teacher-pupil ratio 1.68 0.71 1.75 0.78 2.41 1.81 2.46 1.85 
 (0.15) (0.41) (0.14) (0.38) (0.06)+ (0.07)+ (0.05)* (0.07)+ 
Index of infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.68) (0.93) (0.70) (0.91) (0.57) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) 
% non-sc  teachers -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 (0.56) (0.66) (0.34) (0.98) (0.71) (0.33) (0.84) (0.46) 
% male teachers 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.75) (0.59) (0.97) (0.86) (0.50) (0.25) (0.57) (0.33) 
% teachers with college 
deg -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.78) (0.63) (0.86) (0.53) (0.58) (0.59) (0.55) (0.54) 
% teachers with graduate 
deg 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.02)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)** (0.33) (0.08)+ (0.40) (0.10) 
Av. Years of service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.20) (0.51) (0.87) (0.71) (0.78) (0.75) (0.68) (0.47) 
Av. days in service in last 
year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.14) (0.32) (0.20) (0.43) (0.87) (0.98) (0.95) (0.90) 
% teachers with  pre 
service training 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.59) (0.98) (0.73) (0.81) (0.09)+ (0.02)* (0.11) (0.03)* 
% teachers doing multi 
grade -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.38) (0.07) (0.37) (0.06) (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.02)* 
% teachers actively 
engaged in teaching 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.12 
 (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.00)** (0.03)* 
% contract teachers 
(samvida) - - -0.04 -0.04 - - -0.05 0.00 
 - - (0.56) (0.55) - - (0.47) (0.95) 
% shiksha karmi 
teachers (former 
contract teachers) - - -0.09 -0.09 - - -0.05 -0.04 
 - - (0.03)* (0.01)** - - (0.27) (0.32) 
Block fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 2190 2190 2190 2190 2239 2239 2239 2239 
Robust p values in parentheses clustered at GP level, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant 
at 10%. Other controls include student family background characteristics and block fixed effects. 
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